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The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad by Steven K.
O'Hern. New York: Prometheus Books, 2008. ISBN: 9781591026709. 292 pages. $25.95 (hardcover)
The Iraq War quickly evolved from a "shock and awe" battle into an insurgency. History tells us that effective counterinsurgency (COIN) requires
good intelligence. With a war that has lasted six years, one must ask how
good was the intelligence in Iraq? Not the pre-war intelligence about
which war critics still complain, but, instead, the intelligence used in
fighting the insurgents and other foes that arose after the fall of Baghdad.
In addressing this question The Intelligence Wars suggests the U.S. intelligence effort in Iraq yielded mixed results. The author boils down the
answer and sets the mission for the book in two sentences: "While those
who serve in the intelligence field are often unsung heroes, they are held
back by a system that is defective and dangerous. That is the story of this
book."
Author Steven K. O'Hern uses examples from his experiences as the director of the Strategic Counterintelligence Directorate, a hybrid intelligence
unit in Iraq composed of personnel from the Army, Navy, and Air Force,
to illustrate his observations and criticisms. Although the book arises out
of O'Hern's experiences leading a unit that conducted source operations
against insurgents and conducting other counterintelligence operations,
it is not a memoir. The book also relies on articles written by other Iraq
War veterans to support his main points. The author explains intelligence
operations against an insurgency in a way that is useful to practitioners
and readers interested in current events.
A key argument of the book is that human intelligence (HUMINT) is
underutilized and mismanaged because the military prefers technically
based intelligence (satellites, intercepting phone calls, etc.) instead of
recruiting spies. Intelligence officers and consumers of intelligence
should be interested in the difference in attitudes regarding HUMINT.
According to The Intelligence Wars, senior military intelligence officers
rarely have practical experience in developing and using HUMINT while
at the same time, professional journals and front-line veterans frequently
declare that human intelligence is absolutely critical to fighting an insurgency. O'Hern contrasts the intelligence establishment's lip service about
the importance of HUMINT with the actions of ground commanders who
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improvised and created intelligence operations that relied on human
sources when intelligence assets didn't deliver the actionable intelligence
that infantry commanders needed.
"Stovepipes," the tendency of intelligence units to up-channel but not
share information across organizational lines, is another problem discussed by O'Hern. Many writers have described the failure to share information at the national level, but The Intelligence Wars describes those
failures at the field level with vivid examples of how that failure affects the
Iraq war effort. The book also provides examples of the bureaucratic culture of the intelligence community that stifles effective intelligence collection. The examples of stovepipes and red tape described by O'Hern will
have a familiar ring to intelligence officers but will probably surprise the
average citizen.
Active and former intelligence officers and those in training will appreciate the lessons of the chapters on human intelligence operations. O'Hern,
a retired Air Force Reserve colonel who spent his military career as an
investigator and counterintelligence officer, details what it takes to be a
good source or asset handler. The advice is practical and would benefit
those who handle sources and assets and senior officers who manage the
handlers. Whether a veteran or new to intelligence, the direct writing style
holds the reader's interest even when the book is describing the political
situation in Iraq or details of recruiting and managing a source.
The Intelligence Wars is also the fullest account to date of how Iran introduced the explosively formed penetrator (EFP) weapon into Iraq, even
surpassing the account in the Army's Combating Terrorism Center's
report on Iranian strategy in Iraq released in October 2008. O'Hern
describes how a conscious decision by senior U.S. military intelligence
officers to ignore the threat posed by Iran in 2005 enabled the Iranian
effort to train Shiite militiamen and import EFPs. The sophisticated
attack on the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala, Iraq in
January 2007 carried out by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
and its proxies highlighted the earlier failure to aggressively deal with
Iran's efforts.
In the final chapter of the book, O'Hern makes several recommendations
to cure the problems described. Some will debate the effectiveness of his
recommendations, but perhaps the most valuable aspect of The
Intelligence Wars is its clear description of what one intelligence unit
encountered in fighting an insurgency. As Bart Bechtel, a retired CIA
Operations Officer (and Henley-Putnam University Assistant Chief Academic Officer) notes in the foreword, it is important to record both good
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and bad observations to be read by those who will fight in the future.
Officers and NCOs who do so provide the foundations for better decisions
and leadership for the next generation.
This well-documented book is a must read for students of intelligence,
counterintelligence, and human source operations, especially those who
may deploy to war zones in the future. It describes the difficulties encountered in running a multi-agency intelligence organization in a war theater
and also reminds us of the cost of such operations. The book is dedicated
to nine U.S. Army soldiers and Air Force Office of Special Investigations
special agents who died while serving in Iraq at the Strategic
Counterintelligence Directorate or other assignments. Ironically, two
were killed when an EFP struck their light armored vehicle during an
intelligence collection mission.
Colonel Michael D. Kohn, USAF (Ret.)
Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing
by Tim Shorrock. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008. ISBN:
978-0743282246. $27.00.
This book focuses on the outsourcing of intelligence and what the author
terms the "Intelligence-Industrial Complex." In recent years, the intelligence community (IC) has increasingly relied on private companies not
only to build its collection infrastructure but also to do its fundamental
work of analysis.
Shorrock has uncovered a giant but secretive $50-plus billion-dollar
industry that has grown up servicing the IC. He argues that now our government is so dependent on private companies, there is no way to turn
back.
He paints a picture that to some might be disturbing. The outsourcing
industry gobbles up 70 percent of all intelligence spending. It is dominated by small number of elite super-firms ("primes"), followed by a second-tier group of smaller companies serving as subcontractors to these
giants. The leading primes include such entities as Booz, Allen &
Hamilton, CACI, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC),
BAE Systems, and Lockheed Martin. These companies are able to snag
the massive multiyear contracts, and then in order to get the work done,
squeeze the subcontractors. The "primes," therefore, are gatekeepers who
exercise more power than they should.
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Shorrock views security clearances as more a source of economic power
than as a true safeguard. In the highly classified world of intelligence,
employees are vetted under DCID 6/4 (which ensures their spouse is not a
foreigner) and given humiliating "full lifestyle" polygraphs that track their
most intimate sexual practices. Cleared employees are at a premium, and
accordingly demand premium salaries. More questionably, even securitybackground investigations are outsourced, sometimes to companies that
will benefit financially from having their own employees cleared.
The amount of outsourcing may surprise some. Shorrock provides one
example after another, leaving the reader with an appreciation of the
extent of government dependency on these for-profit outsiders. The
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was built entirely by subcontractors, and despite the sensitivity of its work, it is more than one-half
manned by private-sector employees. Likewise, more than half of CIA's
entire budget is spent on for-profit contractors, and its "number of contract employees now exceeds the agency's full-time workforce of 17,500."
NSA's "industrial base of contractors" in 2001 was 144 companies; by
2006, it was 5,400 companies. Eighty-five percent of the country's intelligence budget is spent by the Department of Defense, but at least "35 percent of the staff at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)...[are]
contractors." For the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), in charge of
"photoreconnaissance and eavesdropping satellites," a whopping 95 percent is outsourced.
For the companies, these opportunities have paid off. The growth rate of
this industry consistently has been in the double digits. For example,
"[b]etween 2002 and 2006, CACI...more than tripled its revenue, from
$564 million a year to nearly $2 billion."
Shorrock attempts to undermine the fundamental assertions of the outsourcing lobby. The practice is supposed to be less expensive for the government, but the reality demonstrates otherwise. Salaries, for instance,
are much higher on the outside. Why pay a person more than a million
dollars annually when a government employee with the same skills gets
around $100,000? Shorrock provides numerous examples in which a
government employee resigns from his job, then returns to the same desk
the next day doing the same work—but as a private-sector employee pulling in a salary up to four times higher than before. In other words, the
government trains while private enterprise reaps the benefit. Ultimately,
outsourcing is not a low-cost solution, it is a high-cost solution, sometimes to levels that only charitably might be described as "abusive."
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In addition, Shorrock describes as "disturbing" the emergence of revolving-door relationships. Before becoming Director of National
Intelligence, Mike McConnell was making more than $2 million per year
as a vice president for Booz, Allen & Hamilton—a company for which
James Woolsey, a former Director of Central Intelligence, serves as president. Shorrock gives many similar examples and suggests that as these
individuals pass back and forth from government to industry, they are
responsible for either handing out lucrative contracts to their former
firms or using their pre-existing IC relationships to learn which contracts
will be let and then exploiting this information to place their bids.
Shorrock's methods of research reflect a combination of his skills as an
investigative reporter and the mistakes made by cleared individuals supposedly trained to keep their mouths shut. He discovered the highly secret
IC budget not by digging up "leaks" from overly-talkative analysts, but
because a spokesperson for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released the information on the Internet in a spreadsheet
attached to a PowerPoint presentation.
A critic of Shorrock might argue that Spies for Hire goes too far by suggesting too many overtones of conspiracy. His view is that something is
wrong with so much money passing through hands, and he sees the system as being grossly corrupt, a coven of thieves. The reality, however, is
that many services, such as launching satellites, have always been performed by private companies under highly regulated government contracts, and that most subcontractors work on razor-thin margins more
reflective of patriotism than profiteering. On the other hand, some of his
criticism seems to hit home, particularly about salary inflation and inbred
government-business relationships. Shorrock's most valuable contribution is that for the first time in print someone has pieced together a map
of the companies that have taken over so much of the intelligence establishment.
The final chapter, "Ideology, Oversight, and the Costs of Secrecy," reviews
a number of policy options being discussed to reform the acquisition process, wrest away power from the primes, and re-establish government
control. Reform, says Shorrock, is crucial because in the IC, unlike lobbying in Congress, the high level of secrecy guarantees there is zero regulation. To that end, some observers are calling for a new wave of "insourcing" to reverse the tide. All are waiting to see what the next administration will do, if anything. Someone there will need to read this book.
Edward M. Roche is Research Professor of Intelligence Technologies at
Henley-Putnam University.
85

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 1

Journal of Strategic Security

The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the
Eavesdropping on America by James Bamford. New York:
Doubleday, 2008. ISBN: 978-90-385-52132-1. 416 pages. $27.95
(hardcover).
Only three books of substance have been written about the National Security Agency (NSA). All were written by James Bamford. This is his third. It
is a must-read for anyone interested in the intelligence world.
Although The Shadow Factory covers much information already known
about NSA, it also contains a few revelations that have generated news
headlines (and a new suit by the ACLU). The controversy has centered
around NSA's practice of eavesdropping on conversations between U.S.
citizens in Iraq and their families stateside. These sometimes intimate
and highly personal conversations not only were recorded, but were transcribed and stored forever in NSA's giant computer banks. Bamford
argues that this policy broke U.S. law and places the blame on former NSA
chief Michael V. Hayden, who became the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in May 2006. The litigation is pending and is
certain to go on for years.
For those interested in the continuing debate over the Fourth
Amendment and the right to privacy, these revelations take top billing.
But Shadow Factory has more information, much more.
Bamford takes the reader on a tour de force of NSA's astounding technical
accomplishments: computers, communications systems, complex databases, modeling algorithms, the list goes on and on. He reports that the
amount of information being stored by NSA is growing by four petabytes
per month. This is equivalent to adding "nearly one billion four-drawer
filing cabinets full of documents...[or] twenty-four trillion pages of text"
each year. He adds that NSA may start measuring its storage in exabytes
(1,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes)—which works out at about 8,000
Libraries of Congress. Bamford also discusses how NSA is building massive data-processing and intelligence-analysis installations throughout
the United States. He observes that the agency's use of electricity at its
original Fort Meade complex off Maryland Route 32 is so great it is straining the power grid of the entire region. In addition, he reviews how NSA
scientists have been responsible for major breakthroughs in supercomputing, cryptography, and analysis.
This information is in sharp contrast to how petty bickering inside the
intelligence community prevented capture of the 9/11 hijackers. The NSA
for a long time had been listening in on a key al-Qa’ida safe house in
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Yemen, but somehow the intelligence "dots" were never connected. When
9/11 happened, the NSA was getting its news not from its billions of dollars' worth of high-tech infrastructure spanning the globe, but from CNN.
Indeed, at this perilous time, fearing an attack on its own Fort Meade
facility, the NSA went so far as to evacuate its personnel.
It is easy to conclude that Bamford is a severe critic of the NSA. After all,
he is a plaintiff in the ACLU's case claiming invasion of privacy. He says
that the NSA is collecting massive amounts of information, but that
"almost none of it is used."
Nevertheless, Bamford also reveals a different side. He describes the database-mining operations that are sifting through this ocean of data and
picking out slim threads that lead to actionable intelligence. He notes that
within three hours after the 9/11 attack, the NSA was already focusing on
critical hijacker communications around the world. Bamford never argues
that NSA should not be there, or that it is incompetent. He seems to recognize the critical role NSA plays, and the incomprehensible complexity
of the information it handles. And he certainly has a substantial admiration for NSA's capabilities.
Instead, Bamford's complaint is about how NSA is used (or in the case of
the hijackers, how the agency was not used). His criticism centers on the
NSA leadership under General Hayden, of whom he paints a picture of a
man too deferential to power, and who over-reacted to the terrorist threat
and in a panic bypassed U.S. law.
After years of research, Bamford has a complex relationship to his subject.
It is a relationship of fear, but also of admiration. His core message is that
such a powerful tool must be used in the right way, consistent with our
Constitution. It is only by remaining true to our founding principles that
the United States can avoid becoming an Orwellian nightmare. On the
other hand, behind its barriers of secrecy, when NSA is used correctly, it
can be an indispensable and very powerful protector of the Republic.
Edward M. Roche is Research Professor of Intelligence Technologies at
Henley-Putnam University.
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Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National
Leadership: A Practical Guide by Gary Berntsen. Dulles,
Virginia: Potomac Books, 2008. ISBN: 978-1-59797-254-3. 154
pages. $19.95 (hardcover).
National security and intelligence challenges have grown and changed
significantly since September 11, 2001. Prior to that, U.S. policymakers
and intelligence-community leaders were prepared to tackle more conventional opponents (such as post-Cold War Russia), but were not ready
to deal with the loosely connected and largely franchised elements of alQa’ida (AQ) and other terrorist groups seeking to destabilize the U.S. and
its forces operating overseas.
As the tactics and strategy of AQ and its affiliates have evolved, the
American intelligence and counterterrorism community has struggled to
keep up—let alone stay one step ahead—by relying less on Human
Intelligence (HUMINT) and more on other tools in the intelligence arsenal. AQ and its sub-groups have in turn returned to traditional methods of
communication and transferring money, materiel, and personnel to frustrate high-tech methods of detection and interception. For this reason,
HUMINT henceforth might be a more optimal method of collecting threat
information and deterring future attacks.
In Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership,
Gary Berntsen, a retired senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer
with over twenty years of experience, addresses these issues by arguing
that the intelligence community requires a drastic shift in mindset and
must reach out to human assets who can penetrate stateless terror networks.
During a recent publicity event at the Middle East Institute in
Washington, D.C., Berntsen unapologetically argued that the HUMINT
and counterterrorism communities have failed to address the nation's
interests. His hope was that the new President would rapidly familiarize
himself with the intelligence and counterterrorism assets at his fingertips
and would impose sufficient oversight within each organization to ensure
synergy among all parties working towards the common goal of keeping
Americans safe at home and abroad.
Berntsen's book also provides a basic overview of the intelligence community, describes how it is structurally organized, and discusses the role of
the CIA, along the way pointing out the administrative, operational, and
theoretical deficiencies standing in the way of the latter working efficiently. Elsewhere, he covers the importance of covert action and
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demands that Washington elites take a stand on the subject one way or
another to avoid legal confusion and needless delays. He asserts that the
President needs an in-depth understanding of how the Clandestine
Service works, in particular source handling and recruitment. He argues
against the use of the polygraph as a screening tool for hiring personnel
and claims it "does more harm than good" by weeding out the most valuable applicants to the Service: those with expertise and experience in
Middle Eastern and Central Asian languages. One of Berntsen's more controversial recommendations is to end the ban on homosexuals serving in
the military, especially if they serve in such a vital career field as linguistic
cryptanalysis. He also recommends service academies make one of the
Middle Eastern languages mandatory for its cadets while recommending
that ROTC and other academy members spend at least a year in that
region absorbing cultural, societal, and relationship norms. Berntsen
emphasizes an aggressive stance with "enemy combatants" and pushes for
more, not less, pressure on detainees.
Finally, Berntsen summarizes his suggestions as bullet points at the end
of each chapter, making it easier for the reader to retain the most important points made. Usefully, he provides a reputable recommended-reading list to allow the reader to educate himself about subjects ranging from
counterinsurgency to terrorism and U.S. foreign policy. He also includes a
glossary and references to past CIA leadership.
Human Intelligence is a useful resource for those either not familiar or
just becoming acquainted with the U.S. intelligence organizations and
their role in counterterrorism. Berntsen uses his years of experience in
the Clandestine Service to buttress his recommendations to improve
HUMINT and counterterrorism efforts. It is certainly an excellent book
for those just beginning their careers in these fields.
Where Berntsen falls short, however, is in his discussions of the Middle
East, specifically the dynamics of secular versus non-secular governments
in the Arab world, religious education, mending relationships between all
levels of law enforcement and Muslim-American communities, and the
true facts underlying prisoner exchanges between Israel and its neighbors. It is apparent that while Berntsen has extensive experience in the
field, his academic expertise appears limited to operational and tactical
HUMINT and counterterrorism. Consequently, he lacks theoretical or
strategic-level acumen of the Middle East and Central Asia.
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Nevertheless, while Berntsen may not hold the foreign-policy credentials
of a statesman, his real-world career in the Clandestine Service more than
qualifies him to provide a framework from which to build better and more
powerful HUMINT and counterterrorism organizations.
Keely M. Fahoum, is an instructor with Henley-Putnam University.
Executive Measures, Terrorism, and National Security—Have
the Rules of the Game Changed? by David Bonner. Aldershot,
UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2007. ISBN 978-0-7546-4756-0. 388
pages. $124.95 (hardcover)
David Bonner, a law professor at University of Leicester School of Law,
presents an in-depth assessment of the measures used by the British government to combat terrorism throughout the years, both at home and in
the colonies. The author not only lists the attempts of the government to
react to threats against the homeland, he paints a critical portrait of the
effects those executive actions have on the human rights afforded citizens
and inhabitants of the United Kingdom (U.K.) as guaranteed by domestic
law, European Union (EU) treaties, and United Nations (UN) conventions
and agreements.
Great Britain has a long history of common law, legislation, and judicial
rulings to guide executive actions against terrorism, all of which are concisely presented by Bonner to build a base for understanding the "how"
and "why" such measures are enacted. While the events of September 11,
2001, appear as a "benchmark" of sorts to separate modern actions from
historical counterterrorism measures, the long history of terrorism
attacks against the U.K on her home soil is also presented. The latter is an
aspect often overlooked in contemporary works. Terrorist acts outlined
date from before World War One, include World War Two, and continue
until the recent "Troubles" in Northern Ireland. British colonial officials
also combated separatist attacks after 1945 in Malaysia, Cyprus, and
Kenya.
Such events, the executive measures utilized, their effects on terrorism,
and just as important, their impact on human rights, are examined in a
manner that both a layman and a professional can understand. The wide
range of examples presented heighten the reader's understanding of terrorist events and the broader consequences of a "War at Home" on a population far better than the usual method of cataloguing the actions of a
single group (such as al-Qa’ida).
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Of particular interest to readers from the law enforcement and military
communities is the attention paid to how terrorist acts affect the operations of both police and military intelligence. The author highlights the
physical effects on military and law-enforcement assets owing to attacks
and bombings. Also examined are the mental effects of terrorist penetration of intelligence services during indigenous operations.
Most assessments of the counterterrorism executive actions undertaken
by the United States are limited to monographs in legal journals—ones
written by legal professionals for their peers. The few assessments that
appear outside of those journals are generic in nature and are, truth be
told, of little use to the homeland-security professional. In contrast,
Bonner's interpretation of British executive measures, and their effects on
terrorism, homeland security, and the legal rights of British nationals,
satisfies both the legal and the homeland-security communities while
being admirably suited for academic and practitioner use.
David G. Popp is an advanced post-graduate student at the University of
Leicester School of Law.
The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional
Intelligence Culture by Ishmael Jones. New York: Encounter
Books, 2008. ISBN: 978-1594032233. 350 pages. $27.95
(hardcover)
The Human Factor is not an ordinary "kiss and tell" memoir; neither is it
like the flood of books blaming the intelligence community for the failures
of 9/11, the second Iraq War, the rise of radical Islamism, and the spread
of nuclear technology to such rogue states as Iran and Pakistan (should
the latter fall victim to Muslim militants). It also is not a deeply analytical
study of how these failures arose or how they could be prevented in the
future. The Human Factor is instead an extended, self-reported psychological study of how at least some of America's "best, brightest, and bravest" have been systematically demoralized and driven quietly from public
service.
Ishmael Jones is a nom de plume for a clandestine case officer in the most
secret part of the CIA: the non-official-cover operatives, known as NOCs.
These officers operate overseas without diplomatic immunity, often in the
most dangerous assignments. If caught they are disavowed by the Agency,
although they are often traded for foreign spies arrested in the U.S. NOCs
lack the protection of international conventions covering the treatment of
diplomats caught "spying" and can be tortured, imprisoned, or even exe91
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cuted. It would be an understatement to say that this is an inherently
stressful job. Divorce, alcoholism, infidelity, and confusion about selfidentity are standard hazards of the profession. As one former colleague
of mine told me after his cover was blown and he had to seek other
employment, "your entire life is a lie. You use your family, your assets/
agents, your friends, and your colleagues all to persuade the citizen of
another country to betray his homeland. His life is in your hands, but the
persona that you reveal to him is a lie and you are supposed to remember
which side you are working for."
Who is Ishmael Jones and is anything in the book verifiable? Except for
some extensive quotations from the public record, much of it well-trod
ground, the answer is No. This limits the utility this book might have had
as an accurate guide to the real problems faced by the Clandestine Service
and how they might be remedied.
Instead, we are left with what appears to be an anonymous book of gripes
by an unhappy ex-employee. Yet the vividness of the narrative of Jones's
career strikes a truthful chord when we compare it to other sourced and
CIA-authorized accounts that are every bit as scathing of the intelligence
community's shortcomings. Many of his stories, too, demonstrate a wry
sense of humor in difficult circumstances and are quite amusing. As one
wag said, "even if these stories aren't true, they ought to be." What we do
know from the public literature is that the Agency has been the source of
enormous, wasteful spending, poor accounting, sloppy security practices,
and self-serving management. Jones gives us a rare bottom-up view of
these problems, a welcome contrast to the more top-down academic critiques produced by college and university professors.
The biggest failure of the book is that Jones, writing at the end of his
career, comes across as embittered, arrogant, self-serving, vengeful, and
potentially violent. Even so, his story is a mandate for corrective action.
For this we are indebted to him for baring his soul so publicly.
Unfortunately, Jones's self-professed aversion to virtually any kind of
management (which he lambastes on almost every page) makes his proposals to reform Agency management practices of limited value. He
admits that he never personally served in any senior management post.
Therefore it is not surprising that he fails to connect the pressures that
senior management faces to the operational frustration he and others are
forced to endure. His lack of experience in the maelstrom of the
Washington interagency process leaves him insensitive to the conflicts
among intelligence agencies and between the intelligence community and
the executive and legislative branches.
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Worse, Jones gives carelessly short shrift to the value of technical means
of collection, such as space-based assets, signals analysis, military collection, and the rest of the collection apparatus of the United States. This
leads him to commit factual errors in the book, in particular his inaccurate allegations about the state of knowledge of the Indian and Pakistani
nuclear programs—matters well-documented in the press critiques and
the post-9/11 Congressional investigations.
Jones is right, nevertheless, when he states that heavy-handed management led to intelligence failures—but that is true of almost every large
institution's failures. His suggestions for flattening management have
already been implemented in the wake of criticism of the CIA restructuring in the wake of 9/11, although not as thoroughly as many would prefer.
His notion of shifting all domestic-based intelligence to the FBI demonstrates his lack of understanding of how dysfunctional the Bureau is as an
intelligence agency when it comes to foreign threats. The 9/11 disaster
was ample proof of that as is the continuing bleed of vital technology
information to Chinese intelligence operatives and agents in the U.S. His
suggestion to shift foreign intelligence to the military is undercut by the
tragic example of Pearl Harbor (which led, ironically, to the very creation
of the CIA).
In conclusion, Jones has written an entertaining and instructive volume
which has a definite place in the study of the intelligence process. Like
every other study of what is inherently a secret business, however, it must
be taken with several large grains of salt. It is a pity what happened to
Jones. He and we deserve better. The numbers of stars in the foyer of CIA
headquarters testify to the ultimate sacrifice of many brave and competent personnel—and we should be wary of failing to honor the "walking
wounded" who too often suffer in vain.
Donald J. Goldstein is an adjunct Professor at Henley-Putnam
University.
The Lost Spy: An American in Stalin's Secret Service by
Andrew Meier. W.W. Norton and Company, 2008. ISBN 9780393060973. 304 pages. $25.95 (hardcover)
Few people today are old enough to recall the American struggle with the
anarchist and socialist movements of the early twentieth century. Andrew
Meier's journey through Isaiah "Cy" Oggins's life as the son of Russian
Jewish immigrants, as Ivy League student at Columbia University, and his
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eventually fatal attraction to the Left before 1914 aims to jog their memories.
Meier was not able to establish a sole motivation for Oggins's attachment
to radical politics from his early adult years. There is no single defining
event that makes him "turn" to Moscow. Nevertheless, it appears that
Oggins was always fascinated by anti-government movements of various
colors and subsequently became bewitched by espionage—and the
intrigues that are part-and-parcel of an operative's life.
After Oggins married Russian-born Nerma Berman—a woman with a still
more intense taste for radicalism than even her husband—there was no
turning back. Disappointingly, Meier's extensive research cannot precisely identify the recruitment of Oggins and his wife into the Russian
intelligence service. Most likely, his contacts at Columbia University initiated the introductions.
Meier discusses other interesting aspects of Soviet subversion, one particularly elaborate scheme being the wide-scale counterfeiting of U.S. currency. I should add that such counterfeiting of remains a serious problem
today. International crime syndicates and at least one state-sponsored
operation keep the United States Secret Service conducting investigations
much as it did during the 1930s and throughout World War II.
Meier brilliantly frames for the reader the struggles of those tumultuous
times alongside a biography of man, his family, and his ideals. That those
very ideals would lead to his arrest and imprisonment (and murder) by
his Russian friends was surely an irony at which even Cy Oggins might
smile bitterly.
Stephen Iannucci is an instructor with Henley-Putnam University.
Threats to Homeland Security: An All-Hazards Perspective.
Edited by Richard J. Kilroy, Jr. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley &
Sons, 2008. ISBN 978-0-470-07398-8, 381 pages. $57.95
(hardcover).
In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, self-proclaimed
"experts" flooded the market with books and articles intended to establish
their bona fides as homeland security or counterterrorism experts. Hastily written and rushed to press, some of these works were superficial and
rehashed accounts of outdated doctrines. Many years later, self-professed
"specialists" still issue books and articles offering panaceas to our
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Homeland Security dilemmas. Although some of them are genuinely solid
works with practical solutions, many are, at best, hack works. In welcome
relief, Threats to Homeland Security: An All-Hazards Perspective, edited
by Richard J. Kilroy, Jr., makes available to the truly interested reader a
guide to help sort through the depth and breadth of the many elements
that encompass the discipline known as Homeland Security.
Kilroy's anthology of essays is a well-constructed college-level textbook
introduction to Homeland Security that smoothly provides a comprehensive framework, although any layperson seeking to better understand
these issues will find the book a good foundation. Kilroy is a retired U.S.
Army Intelligence and Foreign Area Officer (FAO) currently teaching
International Studies and Political Science at the Virginia Military
Institute (VMI). As editor, he brings in a number of academics from
Southeastern universities—mostly East Carolina University (ECU)—to
contribute chapters bound together topically.
The book provides a strategic framework and overview that serves as an
umbrella under which to examine the many disciplines that comprise
Homeland Security. Utilizing a decidedly non-linear approach, it weaves
together the various facets of Homeland Security to show how the various
components are interconnected. The book's method of presenting the
material is intended to encourage critical thinking through the use of
learning objectives for each section, "For Example" boxes throughout the
book elucidate the material presented with historical case studies, as do
pre-tests, self-checks to gauge comprehension, chapter summaries, definitions of key terms, post-tests, and practical exercises to give the reader/
student many opportunities to apply what they've studied and read. The
use of the now-neglected discipline of civics is laudable, as is the discussion of how to protect civil liberties/rights while trying to thwart those
who would do us harm.
The book's approach is a non-partisan, holistic one covering a wide range
of topics. In Chapter 1, John H. P. Williams (ECU) and Kilroy discuss the
changing nature of national security, including the Cold War, the PostCold War era, and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In Chapter 2,
Amy Blizzard (ECU) examines U.S. Homeland Security interests, including protecting people, infrastructure, the economy and our form of government. In Chapter 3, Kilroy provides an all-hazards perspective of
natural and man-made disasters. Chapter 4 is Blizzard's conceptual
framework for assessing threats, including analysis and risk management.
Chapters 5 and 6 are Jeannie Grussendorf's (Georgia State University)
respective examinations of state actors and terrorism and non-state
actors and terrorism. Kilroy tackles cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare in
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Chapter 7. ECU's Alice Anderson deals with weapons of mass destruction
in Chapter 8 and Daniel Masters (University of North Carolina at
Wilmington) looks at domestic terrorism in Chapter 9. Carmine Scavo
(ECU) closes the book with a discussion of enablers of mass effects,
including information as a weapon, the media's role in the GWOT, the
role of the Internet, and the role of educational institutions.
Overall, Threats to Homeland Security: An All-Hazards Perspective is a
useful college textbook that can also guide the layperson towards a rudimentary understanding of the vastness of the many issues that comprise
the various threats to our Homeland Security.
Mark J. Roberts currently serves with the Transportation Security
Administration.
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